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On the Likelihood of Surrogates Conforming
to the Substituted Judgment Standard When
Making End-of-Life Decisions for Their
Partner
Eleonore Batteux , Eamonn Ferguson, and Richard J. Tunney
A considerable proportion of end-of-life decisions are made by the patient’s next-of-kin, who can be asked to follow
the substituted judgment standard and decide based on the patient’s wishes. The question of whether these surrogate
decision makers are actually able to do so has become an important issue. In this study, we examined how the likeli-
hood of surrogates conforming to the substituted judgment standard varies with individual differences in mortality
acceptance and confidence in their decision making. We recruited 153 participants in romantic relationships between
18 and 80 years old from the general population. We asked them to make hypothetical end-of-life decisions for them-
selves and on behalf of their partner, as well as predict what their partner would do, and complete a series of ques-
tionnaires. Participants predicted that their partner would make similar decisions to their own but were more likely
to accept a life-saving treatment that could result in reduced quality of life on their partner’s behalf than for them-
selves. Decisions made by older adults were more likely to conform to the substituted judgment standard, which is
encouraging given that they are more likely to be confronted with these decisions in real life, although this was not
due to differences in mortality acceptance. Older adults were also more likely to have had previous discussions with
their partner and thereby know that person’s wishes and feel confident that they made the right decision, but these
factors did not affect their likelihood of conforming to the substituted judgment standard. This shows that encoura-
ging discussions about end of life among families would ease the decision process, but more work is needed to ensure
that surrogates can adhere to the substituted judgment standard.
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More than 70% of deaths in intensive care units (ICU)
are the result of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, but only about 5% of patients are
able to make these decisions for themselves.1 In these cir-
cumstances, it is common for a next-of-kin to act as a
surrogate decision maker. They are often instructed to
follow the substituted judgment standard, whereby they
must make a decision based on their knowledge of the
patient’s preferences. This varies according to each coun-
try’s legislation. It is the case in the United States that
surrogates are required to follow the substituted
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judgment standard. In the United Kingdom, they are
instructed to consider both the patient’s wishes and his
or her best interests. However, doubts have been cast on
the suitability of the substituted judgment standard,
given that it assumes that surrogates are able to decide
according to the patient’s preferences.
The question of whether surrogates can accurately
predict their next-of-kin’s wishes has been extensively
posed. A systematic review of the literature has found
that surrogate accuracy is around 68%,2 meaning that a
significant proportion of surrogate decision makers did
not meet the substituted judgment standard. A second
question that has arisen is whether surrogates do make
their decisions according to their predictions of the sur-
rogates’ preferences or whether they choose differently.
In this article, we investigate whether a range of factors
affects surrogates’ propensity to make a decision that
conforms with the substituted judgment standard in end-
of-life scenarios.
Tunney and Ziegler’s model3 of surrogate decision
making assumes that the decision maker engages in per-
spective taking, which varies according to particular fea-
tures of the decision (see Figure 1). Surrogates try to
adopt the perspective that matches the required bench-
mark when making end-of-life decisions, given that they
are highly significant decisions for which they could be
held accountable. If surrogates are instructed to follow
the substituted judgment standard, they should engage
in simulated perspective taking (predicting what the reci-
pient would do). Simulation historically refers to the psy-
chological ability to put oneself in other people’s shoes
to predict their behavior.4 This requires acknowledging
the differences between the surrogate and the recipient to
simulate what they would have done. The substituted
judgment standard expects that surrogates take a simu-
lated perspective when making their decision. A simu-
lated decision would be a decision that conforms to the
surrogate’s predictions of what the recipient would have
done. However, they might also follow a benevolent per-
spective (what the recipient should do) to preserve the
recipient’s best interests or engage in an egocentric per-
spective (what the surrogate wants) to preserve their own
interest. Finally, surrogates might rely on a projected
perspective (what the surrogate would do in the recipi-
ent’s situation) if in doubt about the recipient’s prefer-
ences. This is different from the simulated perspective in
that it does not take any differences between the surro-
gate and the recipient into account. The model therefore
assumes that surrogates can be prevented from strictly
adhering to the substituted judgment standard, even if
they intend to make a simulated decision. What can pre-
vious research tell us about the way surrogates make
end-of-life decisions?
Studies that have investigated whether decision mak-
ing on behalf of other people differs from decisions made
for ourselves have found that we are more likely to avoid
taking high risks for others. This has been shown both
when medical professionals make decisions for patients5,6
and when people from the general population decide for
a stranger or family member.7–9 Irrespective of the illness
or treatment in question, surrogates are more likely to
favor the option that is most likely to preserve the
patient’s life. When deciding for themselves, people are
more inclined to accept or refuse a treatment that could
increase their chances of dying to avoid an illness10 or
complications from a treatment.6
These findings have been interpreted as surrogates
being more cautious when deciding for someone else,
rather than surrogates believing that the recipients would
also be more cautious for themselves. Surrogate deci-
sions have in fact been shown to differ from surrogate
predictions—people predict others to take similar risks
as they would, but surrogates take fewer risks for others
than for themselves.11,12 On the other hand, in a within-
subjects design, we found that surrogate predictions were
significant predictors of surrogate choices, independently
Figure 1 Tunney and Ziegler’s model3 of surrogate decision making in which the surrogate considers various perspectives to
make a choice.
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of the decision maker’s own choices.13 This suggests that
surrogates do not simply disregard the recipient’s prefer-
ences but are influenced by other factors.
Qualitative reports of surrogates’ experiences after the
fact confirm that they intend to follow the substituted
judgment standard.14–16 They draw on their knowledge
of the recipient’s wishes, which reassures them that they
are making the right decision, but struggle to ignore
other factors. For example, surrogates feel a responsibil-
ity to preserve the patient’s life and the family’s well-
being. They also find it difficult to disregard their own
wishes for their loved one (i.e., that they do not want to
lose them). This confirms suspicions that the substituted
judgment standard is difficult to meet and is usually not
adhered to in reality.
A recent mixed-methods study17 revealed a number of
factors that affect surrogates’ propensity to make a simu-
lated decision (i.e., decide based on their knowledge of
the recipient’s wishes). Older adult partners were asked
to make a series of end-of-life decisions for each other
before being interviewed about their decision process.
Participants were more likely to take a life-sustaining
treatment for their partner than their partner did for
themselves, thereby resulting in surrogate inaccuracy.
However, surrogates reported that they drew on their
knowledge of the recipient’s wishes to inform their deci-
sions, which gave them the confidence that they were
making the right decision. It seemed to be the case that
those who had previous discussions with their partner
were more confident, which, in turn, made them more
likely to take a simulated perspective. They also seemed
more comfortable with mortality and had had experi-
ences of life-threatening illnesses, either themselves or
through a close relative. They therefore appeared more
prepared to make a decision that would end their part-
ner’s life if they believed those were his or her wishes. In
the present study, we drew from this to experimentally
investigate how these factors affect surrogates’ propen-
sity to make a simulated decision in end-of-life scenarios
and conform to the expectations of the substituted judg-
ment standard.
We recruited participants from the general population
and asked them to make hypothetical end-of-life deci-
sions for themselves and their partner. They were also
asked for their surrogate predictions (i.e., to indicate
what they expect their partner would decide for himself
or herself). This allowed us to compare their surrogate
decisions to their surrogate predictions to evaluate the
extent to which they made a simulated decision. The
more similarities there were between the two, the more
participants were considered to have made a simulated
decision. They then had to indicate their confidence that
they made the right decision, their knowledge of their
partner’s wishes, and whether previous discussions on
the matter had taken place. We measured their fear of their
own and their partner’s death to assess their acceptance of
mortality. Finally, participants reported their previous
experiences relating to illness and death. We recruited a
large range of ages given that these measures are likely to
vary with age. We could then assess whether surrogates’
propensity to make a simulated decision for their partner
varied with age and length of relationship. This study was
preregistered with Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
bsjf8/). Our preregistered hypotheses were as follows:
Hypothesis 1. We expected that participants would pre-
dict that their partner would make similar end-of-life
decisions to their own but would be more willing to
make a decision that would lead to their own life end-
ing rather than their partner’s.
Hypothesis 2. We expected that older adults would be
more likely to have experiences of illness and death,
thereby making them more accepting of mortality for
themselves (2a) and for their partner (2b). We predicted
this to increase their likelihood to refuse treatment,
both for themselves (2c) and for their partner (2d).
Hypothesis 3. We expected that older adults would be
more likely to have experiences of illness and death,
thereby making them more accepting of their partner’s
mortality. We, therefore, predicted that older adults
were more likely to have discussions with their partner,
which in turn increases surrogates’ knowledge of their
partner’s wishes and confidence that they were making
the right decision (3a). We expected this to increase
their likelihood of making a simulated decision (3b)
and lead to smaller self-partner differences (3c). (We
erroneously indicated that this would lead to larger
self-other differences in our preregistration form; we
expect a higher propensity of a simulated decision to
be linked to smaller self-other differences.)
Hypothesis 4. We expected longer relationships with a
partner to increase previous discussions, knowledge of
wishes, and confidence in making the right decision.
We predicted that this in turn would increase their
likelihood of making a simulated decision.
Methods
Design
The study was a within-subjects design where partici-
pants made decisions for themselves and their partner, as
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well as predicted their partner’s wishes. The order in
which these were completed was randomized.
Participants
We recruited participants online via Prolific (https://pro-
lific.ac) from the United Kingdom. Given that we could
not derive an estimated effect size for our study based on
previous research, we hypothesized that we would find a
medium effect size. We conducted a power analysis using
G*Power 3.1 to determine the necessary sample size to
detect a medium effect size using a multiple linear regres-
sion with 7 predictors (to test hypothesis 3). A sample
size of 153 is required to detect a medium effect size
(f2 = 0.15) with high power (..95) and an acceptable a
level (\.05). This sample size allows for enough power
to test the remainder of our hypotheses: detection of a
medium effect (d = 0.5) of recipient (hypothesis 1), with
high power (..95) and an acceptable a level (\.05), and
mediated effects (hypotheses 2–4), assuming that the a
and b paths have medium effect sizes.18 We therefore
recruited 153 participants who were in a romantic rela-
tionship. To obtain a range of ages, we recruited older
adults (60–80) separately from younger adults (18–59).
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of
Nottingham’s ethics committee.
Decision-Making Task
Participants completed 2 scenarios adapted from the will-
ingness to accept life-sustaining treatment (WALT)19
instrument. Each scenario depicted a life-threatening sit-
uation in which participants are taken to the hospital for
weeks to months. They are offered a high-burden treat-
ment course to recover by a doctor. The probability of
the treatment working varied from 90% to 10% in decre-
ments of 10. In each case, participants had to indicate
whether they would want the treatment or not. They
were told that they would not survive without treatment.
Each scenario varied in terms of the outcome of the treat-
ment: either the treatment works and their current health
is restored, or the treatment does not work and they end
up bedbound (functional impairment scenario) or end up
unaware (cognitive impairment scenario). The order in
which they completed each scenario was randomized.
They completed the task 3 times in a random order: once
making decisions for themselves (self), once on behalf of
their partner (partner), and once where they had to pre-
dict what they thought their partner would choose (pre-
diction). The exact wording of the scenarios can be found
in Supplementary File 1.
Questionnaires
Participants completed a series of questionnaires after
the WALT instrument (see Supplementary File 1). They
were first asked questions relating to the scenarios they
had completed: whether they had previously discussed
end-of-life scenarios with their partner (discussions),
whether they felt like they knew their partners’ wishes
(knowledge), and how confident they were that they made
the right decision for themselves and then for their part-
ner (confidence) (on a scale from 1–5). The order in which
they were presented with these questions was rando-
mized. As a measure of fear of their own death and fear of
their partner’s death, participants completed a revised
version of the Collett-Lester Fear of Death scale version
3.0.20 Scale reliability of fear of their own death (a =
0.85) and fear of their partner’s death (a = 0.81) was
good. Finally, they completed a shortened version of the
revised Life Stressor Checklist, which included questions
specific to experiences of illness and death.21
Analysis Procedures
We computed indifference points for each scenario and
condition (i.e., the point at which participants were indif-
ferent between accepting or rejecting the treatment). We
considered the indifference point to be the average of the
2 probabilities on each side of the crossover point from
accepting to refusing the treatment. We then took the
average of the indifference point for both scenarios as a
measure of willingness to accept treatment for each reci-
pient. We excluded participants who made inconsistent
choices (e.g., selecting a treatment with a 40% chance of
recovery but not a 100% chance) as we could not com-
pute an indifference point for them. We considered
inconsistent choices to be problematic as we assumed
that they indicated that the participant did not under-
stand or pay attention to the task (particularly if they
selected only 1 option, but it was not a 100% chance of
recovery). There is a possibility that inconsistent choices
show that the participants were conflicted, but their
responses to the task would be difficult to interpret, so
we did not analyze their choices further. We chose to
compute the indifference point rather than the propor-
tion of times participants selected the treatment option to
avoid including participants who may not have under-
stood or paid attention to the task. We subtracted part-
ner from self to have a measure of self-other differences:
positive values meant that participants accepted more
treatment for their partner than for themselves. We sub-
tracted prediction from partner and removed the sign to
have a measure of simulation. We then reverse scored it
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so that higher values meant that surrogate decisions
deviated less from surrogate predictions and that surro-
gates were more likely to have made a simulated decision.
For every participant, we summed their scores for each
item of the fear of death scales and the life experience
scale. We analyzed our data as stated in our preregistra-
tion as well as some exploratory analyses, which were
all conducted in SPSS (SPSS, Inc., an IBM Company,
Chicago, IL). For our correlation analyses, we used
Pearson’s r for continuous variables and Spearman’s r
for ordinal variables. All mediation analyses were per-
formed using the PROCESS macro for SPSS.22 Effects
were calculated for each 5000 bootstrapped samples.
Results
We recruited 167 participants overall as 6 were excluded
for not being in a relationship and 8 were excluded for
making choices from which we could not compute an
indifference point. All 8 participants we excluded
selected a treatment with a lower chance of recovery than
100% but did not select the treatment with a 100%
chance of recovery. We assumed that they did not under-
stand or pay attention to the task. We then ended up
with 153 participants, as required by our power analysis.
Participant characteristics can be found in Table 1.
Preregistered Analyses
Hypothesis 1. We analyzed participants’ treatment
choices to investigate hypothesis 1. We entered partici-
pants’ indifference points into a repeated-measures anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) with recipient (self, predict,
partner) as a 3-level factor. The main effect of recipient
was significant (F2, 304 = 11.226, MSe = 163.872, P \
0.001, h2p = 0.069) and followed a linear trend
(F1, 152 = 17.943, MSe = 192.753, P \ 0.001, h2p =
0.106). Pairwise comparisons showed that participants
were more willing to accept treatment for their partner
than for themselves (mean difference = 6.72, P\ 0.001).
There was no difference between their own choices and
their surrogate predictions (mean difference = 1.89, P =
0.211), but participants accepted more treatment for their
partner than they predicted their partner would (mean dif-
ference = 4.83, P \ 0.001). Hypothesis 1 was supported
by our findings.
Hypothesis 2. Age was positively correlated with experi-
ences (rs = .228, P = 0.005). However, experiences were
not significantly correlated with fear of their own death
(rs = 2.132, P = 0.103) or their partner’s death (rs =
2.085, P = 0.297). The indirect effect between age and
self with experiences and fear of own death as mediators
was not significant, nor was the one between age and
partner with experiences and fear of partner’s death as
mediators (see Supplementary File 2 for the full analy-
sis). Hypothesis 2 was overall not supported, apart from
the fact that experiences varied with age.
Hypothesis 3a. Age was positively correlated with dis-
cussions (rs = .206, P = 0.032). Discussions were posi-
tively correlated with knowledge (rs = .491, P\ 0.001),
and knowledge was positively correlated with confidence
(rs = .547, P\ 0.001). The mediation analysis examined
the link between age and confidence with discussions and
knowledge as mediators. The total effect of age on confi-
dence was not significant (B = 0.005 [–0.002, 0.012],
SE = 0.003, P = 0.168). The direct effect of age on dis-
cussions was significant (B = 0.011 [0.003, 0.018], SE =
0.038, P = 0.006) and accounted for 4.94% of the var-
iance in discussions. The direct effect of age on knowl-
edge was not significant (B = 20.002 [–0.008, 0.005],
SE = 0.003, P = 0.599), but discussions on knowledge
were (B = 0.453 [0.315, 0.592], SE = 0.070, P\ 0.001);
age and discussions accounted for 22.2% of the variance
in knowledge (F2, 150 = 21.427, P \ 0.001). The direct
effects of age (B = 0.003 [–.004, 0.009], SE = 0.003,
P = 0.400) and discussions (B = 0.085 [–0.061, 0.230],
SE = 0.074, P = 0.251) on confidence were not signifi-
cant, but knowledge was significantly linked to confi-
dence (B = 0.402 [0.252, 0.552], SE = 0.076, P \
0.001); age, discussions, and knowledge accounted for
24.1% of the variance in confidence (F3, 149 = 15.787,
P\ 0.001). The indirect effect of age on confidence was
not significant through discussions (effect = 0.009
[–0.001, 0.003]) or knowledge (effect = 20.001 [–0.003,
0.003]), but it was significant through discussions and
Table 1 Participant Characteristics
Characteristic Participants
Sex, female, % 54
Age, mean (SD), y 45.63 (21.28)
Young adults (aged 18–34 years), % 41
Middle-aged adults (aged 35–59 years), % 12
Older adults (aged 60–80 years), % 47
Length of relationship, mean (SD), y 20.28 (18.37)
Young adults (aged 18–34 years), mean
(SD), y
3.35 (3.99)
Middle-aged adults (aged 35–59 years),
mean (SD), y
19.10 (10.22)
Older adults (aged 60–80 years), mean
(SD), y
35.17 (14.37)
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knowledge (effect = 0.002 [0.001, 0.004]). See Figure 2
for a representation of the model. Hypothesis 3a, which
expected older adults to be more confident they made the
right decision due to previous discussions and increased
knowledge of their partner’s wishes, was supported.
Hypothesis 3b. The likelihood of making a simulated
decision was positively correlated with age (r = .171,
P = 0.035): increased age led to a higher likelihood of
making a simulated decision. However, simulation was
not significantly correlated with discussions (rs = 2.010,
P = 0.904), knowledge (rs = .111, P = 0.171), or confi-
dence (rs = .098, P= 0.227). The indirect effect between
age and simulation with discussions, knowledge, and
confidence as mediators was not significant (see
Supplementary File 2). Hypotheses 3b was only sup-
ported insofar as simulation was linked to age.
Hypothesis 3c. The self-partner difference was not corre-
lated with age (rs = .046, P = 0.576) or discussions
(rs = 2.024, P= 0.769), but the correlation with knowl-
edge fell short of significance (rs = 2.157, P = 0.052).
Confidence was negatively correlated with the self-
partner difference (rs = 2.213, P = 0.008): increased
confidence meant participants were less likely to accept
more treatment for their partner than for themselves.
The mediation analysis examined the link between age
and the self-partner difference with discussions, knowl-
edge, and confidence as mediators. The total effect of age
on self-partner differences was not significant (B= 0.065
[–0.083, 0.213], SE= 0.075, P= 0.385). The direct effect
of age on discussions was significant (B = 0.011 [0.003,
0.018], SE = 0.038, P = 0.006) and accounted for
4.94% of the variance in discussions. The direct effect of
age on knowledge was not significant (B = 20.002
[–0.008, 0.005], SE = 0.003, P = 0.599), but discussions
on knowledge were (B = 0.453 [0.315, 0.592], SE =
0.070, P \ 0.001); age and discussions accounted for
22.2% of the variance in knowledge (F2, 150 = 21.427,
P\ 0.001). The direct effects of age (B = 0.003 [–0.004,
0.009], SE = 0.003, P = 0.400) and discussions (B =
0.085 [–0.061, 0.230], SE = 0.074, P = 0.251) on confi-
dence were not significant, but knowledge was signifi-
cantly linked to confidence (B = 0.402 [0.252, 0.552],
SE = 0.076, P \ 0.001); age, discussions, and knowl-
edge accounted for 24.1% of the variance in confidence
(F3, 149 = 15.787, P \ 0.001). The direct effect of confi-
dence on self-partner differences was significant (B =
–5.470 [–9.399, –1.541], SE = 1.988, P = 0.007), but the
direct effects of age (B = 0.084 [–0.066, 0.234], SE =
0.076, P = 0.271), discussions (B = 0.205 [–3.342,
3.752], SE = 1.795, P = 0.909), and knowledge (B =
1.741 [–2.229, 5.170], SE = 2.009, P = 0.388) were
not; age, discussions, knowledge, and confidence
accounted for 5.43% of the variance in self-other differ-
ences (F4, 148 = 2.126, P = 0.080). The indirect effect of
age on self-partner differences through discussions,
knowledge, and confidence was significant (effect =
–0.011 [–0.028, –0.001]), but none of the other indirect
effects were. See Figure 3 for a representation of the
model. Overall, hypothesis 3c was supported.
Hypothesis 4. Length of relationship was positively cor-
related with discussions (rs = .218, P = 0.007), which
Figure 2 Mediation model showing the relationship between participants’ age and confidence, mediated by previous discussions
and knowledge of their partner’s wishes. If significant (P\ 0.05), unstandardized regression coefficients are denoted with an
asterisk. The mediation model was significant.
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were positively correlated with knowledge (rs = .491,
P \ 0.001), which in turn was positively correlated with
confidence (rs = .547, P \ 0.001). Simulation was posi-
tively correlated with length of relationship (r = .193,
P = 0.017): longer relationships led to a higher likeli-
hood of making a simulated decision. The indirect effect
between length of relationship and simulation with dis-
cussions, knowledge, and confidence as mediators was
not significant (see Supplementary File 2).
Regression analysis. We conducted a hierarchical regres-
sion analysis with age (step 1), experience and fear of
partner’s death (step 2), and discussions, knowledge, and
confidence (step 3) as predictors of the likelihood of mak-
ing a simulated decision. We did not enter length of rela-
tionship as a predictor to avoid collinearity problems as
it was highly correlated with age (r = .865, P \ 0.001).
Step 1 was significant (F1, 151 = 4.543, P = 0.035, R
2 =
0.029), with an increase in age leading to an increase in
the likelihood of making a simulated decision (B =
0.097, SE = 0.046, P = 0.035). Step 2 (F3, 149 = 2.132,
P= 0.099, R2 = 0.041) and step 3 (F6, 146 = 2.903, P=
0.057, R2 = 0.079) fell short of significance. Age was the
only variable that consistently predicted simulation. Full
results can be found in Table 2.
Exploratory Analyses
Treatment choices. To further examine the relationship
between surrogate decisions and predictions, we con-
ducted Pearson’s correlations. Surrogate choices and
predictions were positively correlated (r = 0.860, P \
0.001). Partial correlations between surrogate choices
and predictions, controlling for participants’ own
choices, were significant (r = 0.639, P \ 0.001). We
then performed regression analyses to assess whether
surrogate predictions were predictive of surrogate
choices, independently of participants’ own choices. We
found that the model was significant (F2, 150 = 253.352,
P \ 0.001) and accounted for 77.2% of the variance in
surrogate choices. Surrogate predictions significantly
predicted surrogate choices (B = 0.700, SE = 0.069,
P \ 0.001), but so did participants’ own choices (B =
0.313, SE= 0.069, P\ 0.001).
Figure 3 Mediation model showing the relationship between participants’ age and self-partner difference, mediated by previous
discussions, knowledge of their partner’s wishes, and their confidence that they made the right surrogate decision. If significant
(P\ 0.05), unstandardized regression coefficients are denoted with an asterisk. The mediation model was significant.
Table 2 Regression Model for Likelihood of Making
a Simulated Decision
B SE P
1 Constant 15.710 2.301 \0.001
Age 0.097 0.046 0.035
2 Constant 25.283 7.460 0.001
Age 0.102 0.048 0.035
Experiences 0.354 0.703 0.615
Fear of death 0.207 0.161 0.199
3 Constant 38.010 9.313 \0.001
Age 0.103 0.048 0.034
Experiences 0.429 0.733 0.559
Fear of death 0.265 0.165 0.111
Discussions –1.185 1.152 0.305
Knowledge 1.661 1.273 0.194
Confidence 1.684 1.227 0.172
Note: The bold p-values represent statistically significant results at
p\.05.
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Discussions. We assessed whether experiences of illness
and death had a relationship with surrogates’ propensity
to discuss end-of-life scenarios, controlling for age. We
found a positive relationship between the two (rs = .358,
P\ 0.001). We conducted a hierarchical regression anal-
ysis with age (step 1) and experience (step 2) as predictors
of discussions. Step 1 was significant (F1, 151 = 7.798,
P= 0.006, R2 = 0.049), with any increase in age leading
to an increase in discussions (B = 0.011, SE = 0.004,
P = 0.006). Step 2 (F2, 150 = 11.239, P \ 0.001, R
2 =
0.142) was also significant, with an increase in experience
leading to an increase in discussions (B = 0.224, SE =
0.056, P \ 0.001). Age was no longer a significant pre-
dictor (B= 0.007, SE= 0.004, P= 0.071).
Confidence. We conducted a paired-samples t test to
compare participants’ confidence that they made the
right decision for themselves to their confidence that they
made the right decision for their partner. We found that
participants were significantly more confident for them-
selves (mean = 4.19, SD = 0.82) than for their partner
(mean = 3.86, SD = 0.91) (t1, 152 = 5.300, P\ 0.001).
Fear of death. We split each scale into the 2 subscales of
the original Collet-Lester fear of death scale20: the pros-
pect of death itself and the process of dying (see
Supplementary File 2). We entered participants’ scores
for each subscale into a 2 (person) 3 2 (subscale)
repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of
person: participants were more fearful of their partner’s
death than their own (F1, 152 = 110.417, MSe = 12.634,
P\ 0.001, h2p = 0.421). We found a main effect of sub-
scale: participants were more fearful of the process
of dying than the prospect of death (F1, 152 = 23.085,
MSe = 8.376, P \ 0.001, h2p = 0.132). We also found
an interaction between person and subscale (F1, 152 =
120.889, MSe = 6.261, P \ 0.001, h2p = 0.113).
Pairwise comparisons showed that participants were
more fearful of the process of dying than the prospect of
death for themselves (mean difference = 22.013, P \
0.001) but not for their partner (mean difference =
20.235, P = 0.308). Moreover, we found a negative
relationship between age and fear of the prospect of
death, both for participants’ own death (rs = –.299, P\
0.001) and their partner’s death (rs = 2.208, P =
0.010).
Discussion
This study sheds new light on the surrogate decision pro-
cess, including surrogates’ propensity to decide according
to their predictions of the recipient’s preferences. We
show that previous discussions between partners increase
their confidence that they are making the right decision.a
This suggests that encouraging people to have discus-
sions earlier about end-of-life preferences would ease the
decision process. We also found that surrogates who had
been in a relationship for longer were more likely to con-
form to the substituted judgment standard. They were
more likely to have had discussions about end of life, but
we did not find that these increased surrogates’ likeli-
hood of deciding according to their predictions of the
recipient’s preferences. Although discussions can relieve
the burden experienced by surrogate decision makers,
they might not successfully reduce surrogate inaccuracy.
As expected, age had an effect on experiences and
individual differences relating to mortality: older adults
were more frequently exposed to experiences of illness
and death and were more likely to fear the prospect of
their own and their partner’s death. Age also had an
effect on the process of making a surrogate decision:
older adults were more likely to have discussions about
end of life with their partners, which can be attributed to
their previous experiences of illness and death. Notably,
having prior discussions increased surrogates’ knowledge
of their partner’s wishes and their confidence that, from
their perspective, they were making the right decision.
These findings shed light on the process of making a sur-
rogate decision, which seems to be eased by having these
prior discussions and feeling like one knows the recipi-
ent’s wishes. Crucially, this shows that participants hold
a conception of the right decision as being related to
making a decision in line with the substituted judgment
standard. This lends support to its validity as an ethical
framework.
The finding that participants who were older and had
been in a relationship for longer were more likely to
decide based on their surrogate predictions for their part-
ner lends support to Tunney and Ziegler’s model.3
Indeed, it predicts that surrogates who are more familiar
with the recipient are more likely to take a simulated per-
spective as they believe it would match the recipient’s
preferences. This is an encouraging result as these demo-
graphic groups are more likely to find themselves having
to make a surrogate decision for their partner. However,
aWe asked participants whether they were confident that they
made the right decision, without giving them an indication of
what the ‘‘right’’ decision might refer to. The conclusions we
draw about making the right decision are solely from the sub-
jective perspective of the participant. We do not put forward a
position on what might be the ‘‘right’’ decision here.
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we did not find that surrogates’ previous discussions
with their partner or knowledge of their partner’s prefer-
ences increased the likelihood of a simulated decision.
This is consistent with the finding that surrogates having
prior discussions with their next-of-kin does not increase
surrogate accuracy.2 This means that although prior dis-
cussions and increased knowledge might be helpful from the
point of view of the decision maker, they might not be the
best way to improve the accuracy of surrogate decisions.
Participants were more likely to accept a life-saving
treatment, at the risk of impaired quality of life, for their
partner than for themselves. Interestingly, this was
despite the fact that surrogates predicted their partner’s
decisions to be similar to their own. On the other hand,
we did find that surrogate predictions were predictive of
surrogate decisions, even after controlling for partici-
pant’s own choices. It seems to be the case that surro-
gates do engage in a simulated perspective and take into
account the recipient’s wishes, which moderates the state-
ment that surrogates do not follow the substituted judg-
ment standard. Furthermore, we found new evidence
relating to the self-other difference. Participants who
were more confident that they made the right decision
for their partner showed smaller self-other differences—
they were less likely to accept more treatment for their
partner than for themselves. This could mean that surro-
gates believe the wrong decision would be to accept more
treatment for their partner than themselves to keep that
person alive, which is coherent with the idea that the
right decision is one that conforms to the substituted
judgment standard, according to our participants.
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find that
any of our measures related to mortality had an effect on
participants’ propensity to accept life-saving treatment,
neither for themselves nor for their partner. This is con-
sistent with Batteux et al.,13 who found that surrogates
reported similar wishes and decision processes despite
large variabilities in their propensity to accept life-saving
treatment. More research is therefore needed to under-
stand this variability. There are also many aspects of the
experience and acceptance of mortality that we did not
investigate here, such as how participants reflected on
these life events. Exploring these individual differences in
more detail might help elucidate the relationship between
age and the likelihood of conforming to the substituted
judgment standard.
Our findings are consistent with previous qualitative
reports that show that discussions and knowledge of the
patient’s wishes helped them throughout the process.14–16
Surrogates do worry about whether they have made the
right decision after the fact,23 thereby reinforcing the
need for encouraging discussions in light of our findings.
Discussions beyond the surrogate-recipient dyad could
also help alleviate conflicts between family members,
particularly when the family’s wishes prevent the surro-
gate from respecting the patient’s wishes.23 However,
other measures could also be put in place that might be
easier than altering the communication patterns of all
potential surrogates. Recommendations have been made
about how clinicians can ease the process. Clinicians who
are informative, available for communication, and sup-
portive of surrogates’ decisions have been found to alle-
viate the burden experienced by surrogates, which seems
to put them in a better position to make a decision that
they think is right.23 Care providers could also be a valu-
able resource before the fact, by encouraging and facili-
tating discussions between patients at risk of losing their
decision-making capacity and their family members.
Conclusions and Future Directions
The present study shows that previous discussions
between surrogates and the recipient should ease the pro-
cess of making a surrogate decision and give surrogates
more confidence that they are making the right decision
but do not increase the likelihood of making a simulated
decision and thereby conforming to the substituted judg-
ment standard. Nevertheless, interventions that are
designed to foster these discussions between family mem-
bers would still be useful to relieve the burden placed on
the decision maker, particularly for those without previ-
ous experiences of illness and death and are therefore less
likely to have these discussions. It seems to be the case
that older surrogates are more inclined to decide based
on their partner’s wishes, although we were not able to
disentangle whether this was an effect of age or length of
relationship. This would be a fruitful avenue for future
research given that older adult partners are far from
being the only kind of surrogate-recipient relationship.
Indeed, surrogate decisions are often made by adult chil-
dren of the recipient,16 meaning that we need to investi-
gate whether our findings are affected by the nature of
the surrogate-recipient relationship. For example, part-
ners might prioritize honoring each other’s wishes,
whereas adult children might be drawn to the issue of
care when deciding for their parents. If this is the case,
discussions would be a more effective way to ease the
process in the former than the latter. Finally, although
we were not able to measure surrogate accuracy, it is a
necessary step to examining the applicability of the sub-
stituted judgment standard. It would be useful to assess
how the likelihood of making a simulated decision
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affects surrogate accuracy and whether the factors we
identified here influence that relationship.
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